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Abstract 
In this paper, we demonstrate the potential of behavioural microsimulation models as 
powerful tools for the ex ante evaluation of public policies. The subject of our analysis is the 
impact of recent Spanish Income Tax reforms on efficiency and household and social welfare. 
We also analyze the likely effects of some basic income – flat tax and vital minimum – flat 
tax schemes. The analysis is carried out using a microsimulation model in which labour 
supply is explicitly taken into account. Instead of following the traditional continuous 
approach (Hausman 1981, 1985a, and 1985b), we estimate the direct utility function using the 
methodology proposed by Van Soest (1995). Our data come from a sample of Spanish 
individuals in the 1995 wave of the EC Household Panel. We show that in the Spanish case, 
the redistribution policies considered have only little impact on the efficiency of the economy. 
On the contrary, they strongly affect social welfare.  
 
Résumé 
Dans cet article, on démontre le potentiel des modèles de microsimulation avec 
comportements dans l'évaluation ex ante des politiques publiques. Le sujet de notre analyse 
est l’impact sur l’efficacité et sur le bien-être des ménages, des réformes récentes de l’impôt 
sur les revenus implémentées en Espagne. On analyse aussi les effets de certains scénarios de 
réforme inspirés de la logique du revenu minimum – impôt linéaire. L’analyse est effectuée à 
l’aide d’un modèle de microsimulation avec réactions d’offre de travail. Au lieu de suivre 
l’approche traditionnelle à la Hausman (1981, 1985a, 1985b), on estime directement les 
paramètres de la fonction d’utilité en employant la méthodologie proposée par Van Soest 
(1995). Les données ont été récupérées à partir de la vague 1995 du Panel européen des 
ménages (ECHP). On démontre que, dans le cas espagnol, les politiques redistributives 
implémentées ont des effets mineurs sur l’efficacité économique, par contre, elles augmentent 
de façon importante le bien-être social. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, there have been wide-scale changes in the Spanish redistribution 
system.1 Since 1979, the year of the creation of income tax, two main reforms have been 
implemented. In 1989, a large-scale reform provided married wage earners with the 
possibility of making separate tax declarations. The Personal Income Tax (PIT) system was 
again reformed in 1999, and the subsequent equity and efficiency effects have been subject of 
both political and academic debate. 
The evaluation of the reform has been carried out mainly via arithmetical simulation 
techniques. Castañer et al. (2000) use the Taxpayers Panel of the Spanish Tax Agency (Panel 
de Declarantes por IRPF) to examine the implications of the reform in terms of redistribution 
and welfare. They show that the 1999 scheme reduces total redistribution, mainly through the 
reduction of tax receipts. Using the European Community Household Panel and the 
microsimulation model GLADHISPANIA, Oliver and Spadaro (2003) find similar results. 
Levy and Mercader-Prats (2002) focus on the analysis of the withholding mechanism and the 
efficiency effects of the new income tax system. They show that the 1999 reform failed to 
reduce the compliance costs of taxpayers. Sanchís and Sanchís (2001) simulate the new PIT 
system, taking into account the effects on household consumption of a VAT increase 
introduced to compensate for the fall in income tax revenue.  
The main pitfall of arithmetical analysis is the absence of behavioural reactions. With 
respect to the labour market, for example, some of the changes introduced by the reform are 
                                                 
1 An historical description can be found in Cantó et al. (2002). 
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particularly designed to provide incentives for the participation of certain groups. Even if this 
is not the case, we may expect some effects on household consumption/labour supply 
patterns, at least in the medium-long run. The main concern of this paper is to shed some light 
on these issues by measuring the impact of the reforms on labour supply behaviour and to 
evaluate their effects on individual and social welfare.  
There have been very few attempts to evaluate Spanish PIT reforms including labour 
supply behavioural reactions (Labeaga and Sanz, 2001, García and Suarez, 2002, Prieto and 
Alvarez, 2002 and Castañer et al., 2004). In all of these papers, the labour supply model is 
based on the traditional continuous approach (see Hausman, 1981 and 1985a) that has been 
recognized to suffer from several problems. One is the lack of identification of the responses 
of hours to marginal changes in taxes (see, for instance, Van Soest, 1995); another is the 
under-identification of wage effects due to misspecification of dynamic components (see 
McCurdy, 1992 or Arellano et al., 1999). The principal inconvenience of using this 
methodology is that the behavioural restrictions it imposes are too strong, requiring that the 
labour supply function globally satisfies the Slustky conditions. As a result, the estimation 
results suffer from a lack of robustness, which reduces their usefulness for policy evaluation 
(see MaCurdy et al., 1990, and MaCurdy, 1992).  
Such weaknesses have pushed researchers towards the estimation of total income 
elasticities (Feldstein, 1995, Auten and Carroll, 1999, Gruber and Saez, 2002) or the 
estimation of direct utility functions by a discretisation of the labour supply alternatives (Van 
Soest, 1995, Aaberge et al., 1995, Hoynes, 1996, Bingley and Walker, 1997, Keane and 
Moffit, 1998 and Blundell et al., 2000). This second approach has been heavily employed in 
the recent analysis of tax reforms. Since behavioural changes probably occur at the corner or 
kink points of the labour supply function, this method has the advantage of capturing them, 
providing the analyst with an estimation of the elasticity at the extensive margin. Moreover, 
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this methodology allows us to avoid the computational and analytical difficulties associated 
with utility maximization under non-linear and non-convex budget constraints. This is 
because the budget constraint is now directly modelled in the utility function. It also enables 
to consider fixed costs, simultaneous participation and the intensity of work choices, as well 
as spouses' joint labour supply decisions. 
An excellent application of behavioural microsimulation based on discrete choice models, 
which illustrates very well the potential of this approach, is that of Blundell et al. (2000), 
which evaluates the likely effect of the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit 
(WTFC) in the UK. They estimate, separately, a discrete labour supply model for married 
couples and single parents on a sample of UK households in the Family Resources Survey for 
1995 and 1996. The particularity of the model lies in its ability to include childcare costs 
which vary with hours of work. They then use their results to simulate labour supply 
responses under the new budget constraint using the TAXBEN microsimulation model 
developed at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The results show that the introduction of 
behavioural responses reduces the estimated cost of the WFTC program by 14% from its level 
in the purely arithmetical scenario. This is mostly due to an increase in labour force 
participation by single mothers. Similar analysis has been carried out to evaluate recent 
reforms in the US (Hoynes, 1996 and Keane and Moffit, 1998), Italy, Norway and Sweden 
(Aaberge et al., 2000), the Netherlands (Das and Van Soest, 2000), Germany (Bonin et al., 
2002) and France (Bargain, 2005). A first objective of this paper is, therefore, to provide, for 
Spain, an estimation of the labour supply reactions under the “discrete choice” framework. 
A striking feature of the papers cited above is that policy evaluation is carried out using 
only the sub-sample for which it is possible to estimate labour supply responses. The inactive 
population (i.e. pensioners, students, handicapped, etc.) is excluded from the global analysis 
of the reforms. This feature is somewhat in contradiction with the standard microsimulation 
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practice that, on the contrary, makes substantial efforts to retain all of the population 
heterogeneity in the evaluation exercise (see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005). Moreover 
structural reform, such as that in 1999 in Spain, covers the whole population and produces 
global welfare effects that should be incorporated in any evaluation exercise.  
In our opinion, one potential solution to these problems is to carry out a microsimulation 
exercise combining arithmetic and behavioural instruments in order to adjust the after-tax 
figures and produce results for the population as a whole. This is our second methodological 
contribution. In this paper, first, we estimate structural labour supply on two sub-samples of 
potential participants in the labour market (singles and couples). Second, we use the 
estimation results from the behavioural modules of the microsimulation model to compute the 
ex post patterns of labour supply (and utility) of these agents. Third, we perform an 
arithmetical simulation on the remaining part of the population in the sample. This procedure 
allows us to obtain a global evaluation of both the efficiency and welfare impacts of the 
reforms considered.  
Given the policy implications of the evaluation results, in addition to the 1999 reform, we 
also consider other hypothetical scenarios inspired by the basic income – flat tax (BIFT) and 
vital minimum – flat tax (VMFT) philosophies (see Atkinson, 1995). The objective of these 
exercises is to shed light on the potential of BIFT and VMFT to reduce inequality and to 
increase social welfare in Spain (see Oliver and Spadaro, 2003). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, the micro-
simulation model and the main features of the systems simulated (1998 PIT, 1999 PIT and the 
simulated BIFT and VMFT). Section 3 presents the discrete labour supply model, and its 
econometric specification and estimation. The evaluation of the different policy scenarios is 
carried out in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Data, micro-simulation model and main features of redistribution systems 
We use the Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The 
last Spanish wave when we constructed the microsimulation model was that of 1995. Given 
that we are interested in comparing the 1998 and 1999 scenarios, and that the monetary 
variables in the 1995 wave are from 1994, we update them using the nominal growth rate 
(inflation plus real growth). To update incomes from 1994 to 1998 we use the factor 1.281; 
from 1994 to 1999 the updating factor is 1.335. In Table 1 we compare household net income 
in the 1998 and 1999 ECHP waves (actually available but not yet implemented in the 
microsimulation model) with that in our updated dataset. After updating net income, we 
convert to gross income using the micro-simulation model GLADHISPANIA, in which we 
can compute, from net incomes, social contributions, total income tax and also the monthly 
amounts that are withheld from income in anticipation of the yearly income tax bill. This is 
carried out via a fixed-point algorithm which iterates until it reaches the withholdings, income 
tax and social insurance contribution patterns which best fit the net incomes observed in the 
data.2 The results of the model’s calibration are shown in table 2, where they are compared to 
the corresponding aggregate figures reported in official statistics. The number of households 
in the database is 6,522. After dropping 102 observations due to missing information about 
the household head (which we need to compute income tax accurately), we have 6,420 
households, representative of the total number of households in the Spanish population 
(12,068,375 in 1995, source INE). The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
econometric section are given in table 3. The scenarios which we simulate using 
GLADHISPANIA are described below. 
The 1998 and 1999 Spanish direct redistribution systems 
                                                 
2 A full description of the micro-simulation model (GLADHISPANIA), of the dataset and of the net to gross 
algorithm is contained in Oliver and Spadaro (2004a). 
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The model replicates social contributions levied on wages (for employers and employees) 
and on self-employed workers and income taxes. Table 4 sets out the social contribution rates 
of firms and employees and the maximum and minimum contribution base-rates for 1998 and 
1999.  
With respect to the 1998 system, the 1999 reform moved from a PIT structure in which 
individuals' specific conditions were taken into account mainly by means of tax deductions to 
one in which they are reflected in tax allowances. Some of the 1998 tax deductions were 
included in the subsistence-level minimum income (i.e. personal and family tax deductions); 
others became tax deductions on different kinds of expenditure (i.e. tax deductions on 
employee wages) and some were eliminated altogether (i.e. house rentals). Nevertheless, the 
main feature of the reform (for our purposes) is that the reduction in both tax brackets (from 9 
to 6) and tax rates (as can be seen in table 5). In particular maximum and minimum marginal 
taxes fell asymmetrically: the former was reduced from 56% to 48%, whilst the latter fell 
from 20% to 18%.  
The Basic Income- Flat Tax (BIFT) and the Vital Minimum-Flat Tax (VMFT) 
As mentioned above, the debate over the suitability of the reforms to the Spanish 
redistribution system is still open. Recently, alternative schemes based on a flat tax 
mechanism have been proposed (Oliver and Spadaro, 2003). The underlying idea is to 
simplify the tax structure and, at the same time, to introduce a sort of “citizens' income”. In 
order to explore the ensuing implications on welfare and redistribution, we carry out 
simulations of the basic income-flat tax reform (BIFT) and the vital minimum-flat tax 
(VMFT) reforms. Both replace the 1999 PIT leaving the social security contributions scheme 
unchanged. 
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The VMFT reform replaces the 1999 PIT with a vital minimum, which consists of a tax 
allowance per equivalent adult3 and a proportional tax on taxable income. The BIFT reform 
consists of a universal lump-sum transfer, called the “basic income” (i.e. an amount of money 
that the government allocates to each household, independent of income and status) plus a flat 
tax on taxable income. As for VMFT, we take into account the number of household 
members, yielding a basic income per equivalent adult.  
The advantages or disadvantages of a VMFT or BIFT scheme are well known in the 
literature (see Atkinson, 1995); they are described in table 6. The main inconvenience is the 
labour supply disincentives that a high flat tax may engender. The econometric model used in 
the next section takes these disincentives into account and quantifies their impact. 
We run four simulations for different flat rates. To facilitate the redistribution analysis, 
the basic income or vital minimum has been chosen to respect the government’s budget 
constraint (with respect to our year of reference, 1999) in an arithmetical framework. In Table 
6, we show the four simulated scenarios. We start from the maximum marginal tax rate of the 
1999 system (46%); which allows 4,632 euros of annual basic income per equivalent adult 
(and 13,997 euros as the vital minimum), and we reduce the flat tax rate to 38%, 30% and 
25%. Obviously, reducing the flat tax implies reducing the basic income or vital minimum, as 
shown in table 7. 
 
3. The labour supply model, econometric methodology and results 
3.1. The labour supply model 
We assume that individuals derive utility from household income, y, and from leisure, L 
= T – h, with T total time available and h hours of work, with the following utility function: 
   U = U(y, h; Z)      (1) 
                                                 
3 The equivalence scale used is the square root of the number of household members. 
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Here Z are individual characteristics. Consumers maximize utility subject to the usual budget 
constraint, which is defined in terms of gross real wages, w, total household non-labour 
income, µ, and the tax system T(h, w, µ, Z), where h = T – L. If there are no fixed costs, the 
budget constraint is: 
  y = wh + µ - T(h, w, µ, Z)      (2) 
where T(h, w, µ, Z) are tax payments net of benefits, which in the Spanish tax system depend 
on hours, wages, non-labour income and demographic characteristics. The consumer's 
problem can then be written as: 
),,( ZhyU   Maxh  subject to ),,,( ZhwTwhy µµ −+≤     (3) 
The solution to (3) is complex because T(.) is non-linear, although it is always possible to 
optimize for a given marginal tax rate and to obtain a parametric Marshallian labour supply 
function. In the discrete choice approach, instead of estimating the Marshallian labour supply 
parameters, we start from the specification of utility U(.) and estimate the parameters of this 
function. In what follows we assume the flexible quadratic utility function (as in Keane and 
Moffit, 1998, and Blundell et al., 2000): 
U(y, h, Z) = αyy y2 + αhh h2+ αyh yh + βy(Z) y + βh (Z) h   (4) 
for the singles sub-sample, and 
U(y, hm, hf, Zm, Zf, Z) = αyyy2 + αhmhmh2m + αhfhfh2f + αyhmyhm + αyhfyhf + αhmhfhmhf 
            + βyy + βhmhm + βhfhf      (5) 
for couples. The variables hi and Zi, i = m, f, are, respectively, hours and demographic 
characteristics of the member i of the couple. The parameters of income and hours may be 
linear functions of individual demographic characteristics, so that:4 
 0 'y y y Zβ β β= +  
                                                 
4 An hours equation, which is highly non-linear in the parameters, can be derived from this utility function (see 
Keane and Moffit, 1998). By using the hours equation joint with the budget constraint, it is also possible to 
recover the indirect utility function. 
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 0 'hm hm hm mZβ β β= +         (6) 
 'hf hf hf fZβ β β= +  
These functional forms are easily tractable and, at the same time, allow a wide range of 
potential behavioural responses.5 
Another important issue concerns the presence of fixed costs, which can arise for several 
reasons such as job search, commuting or costs of children. We assume that they depend on 
observed variables, so that FC = Zfcβfc, and they should be deducted from income. Individuals 
thus evaluate utility, U = U(y - FC, h; Z), for all possible values of income (net of fixed 
costs). The effect of these costs on each individual (household) depends on observables Zfc, 
whose weights, βfc, are estimated at the same time as the rest of the parameters of the utility 
function. 
 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
We directly estimate the parameters of the utility function (4) or (5) for different sub-
samples of the Spanish population. We select a sample selection consisting only of wage 
earners. However, since marital status likely has significant consequences on labour supply 
(mainly for the wife but also for the husband), we further separate into sub-samples. We 
estimate the utility function separately for couples (5) and for singles (4). This has effects 
both on the coefficients and, for instance, on the necessity of including fixed costs. Given that 
we estimate a discrete choice model, we have first to decide the finite set hi ∈ {h1, h2, ..., hKi}, 
i= male, female, over which individuals choose their hours. The observability rule in a typical 
multinomial model is: 
   hi = h1 if h ≤ hB1 
         = h2 if hB1 < h ≤ hB2 
                                                 
5 See Stern (1986) for a discussion of the properties of these and other functions. 
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   ....................................... 
        = hK-1 if hBK-1 < h ≤ hBK-1 
        = hK if h > hBK-1 
The appropriate number of intervals is evaluated by looking at the histograms of hours for 
both males and females (see Figure 1). Once we have decided the choice set, we have Ki 
alternative values for hours for agent i (Km·Kf  for the household), which determine the total 
income of the individual (household): 
 [ ] );,,( iiiiii ZwhThwhy µµ −+=  for { }iKhhhh ,...,, 21∈   (7) 
 [ ] ),,;,,,,(, (·)(·)(·)(·)(·)(·) ZZZwwhhThwhwhhy fmfmfmffmmfm µµ −++=  (8) 
for all possible combinations of hm(.) ∈ {h1m(.), h2m(.), …, hKmm(.)}, and hf(.)∈ {h1f(.), h2f(.), …, 
hKff(.)}. The variables wm and wf are, respectively, gross wages of men and women. The 
individual (household) maximizes (4) or (5) over the set of hours hi ∈ {h1, h2, ..., hKi}. To 
estimate the model we have to add stochastic terms to the utility function. In what follows, we 
only add shocks specific to the state or hours regime for each of the possible choices, which 
we assume are generated by extreme value distributions. Under these assumptions we can 
derive the choice probability for agent i as: 
{ }* *
*
*
1
Pr , Pr , 1, 2,...,
exp ( , ;
exp ( , ;
j K
j
k
j
i i i
j
i
K
k
i
k
h h Z U U for all k j k K
U y T h Z
U y T h Z
=
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= = > ≠ ∈⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦=
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑
  (9) 
where U*(.) = U(.) + εhi.  
Similarly, for a couple, we can write the joint probability of preferring a combination of 
hours (hm(.), hf(.)) as: 
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*
*
Pr , , , , Pr ,
exp ( , , , ; , ,
exp ( , , , ; , ,
j k s t
m f m f
j k
m m f f m f h h h h
j k j k
m f m f m f
j k j k
m f m f m f
s t
h h h h Z Z Z U U for all s j t k
U y h h T h T h Z Z Z
U y h h T h T h Z Z Z
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= = = > ≠ ≠⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∑∑
   (10) 
where U*(.) is now equal to U(.) + εhmhf. Under the hypothesis of independent errors, we can 
write the likelihood function Φ of each model, respectively, as: 
  [ ]∑∑
= =
==
N
1i
i
ki
i
K
1k
ks Z;hhPr(lndlnΦ      (11) 
  [ ]∑∑
= =
===
N
1i
fm
k
(·)f(·)f
j
(·)m(·)m
K
1k
jkc Z,Z,Z;hh,hhPr(lndlnΦ   (12) 
where the sub-indices s and c stand for singles and couples respectively. The variables dk and 
djk are (1, 0) dummies: dk = 1 if [hi = hki] and djk = 1 if [hm(.) = hjm  and  hf(.) = hkf] . All of the 
parameters in the utility functions are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
3.3. The results 
The estimation of the model follows the identification of the set of labour supply 
alternatives for each individual. This latter is carried out by looking at the data on hours of 
work (see Aaberge et al., 2005, for example). In Figure 1a we show the distribution of hours 
of work for singles; Figures 1b and 1c contain, respectively, analogous numbers for the 
household head (in a couple) and for his/her wife/husband. We observe considerable 
differences in the non-participation rate between these figures: non-participation of singles is 
around 20%; for household heads (in couples), we observe a figure of around 6%, which 
however raises to 59% for his/her spouse.  
The mode is similar across the three distributions: in all three a large percentage of 
observations fall between 35 and 42 hours of work, which corresponds to full-time work in 
Spain. We set up different choice sets for singles and for the two members of couples, 
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according to these distributions. For singles we construct brackets for 0-4, 5-34, 35-44 and 
over 44 hours, which correspond to actual hours values (in the utility function) of 0, 30, 40 
and 50, respectively. For couples, the choice set of the household head is 0, 40 and 50, since 
there is no part-time employment. These choices correspond to the intervals 0-4, 5-44 and 
more than 44. For the second member of the couple, the “0” option corresponds to bracket 0-
4, the option “25” corresponds to the interval 5-34 and the option “40” corresponds to the 
bracket “more than 35 hours of work”. 
We obtain estimates of the parameters of the utility function for singles (eq. 4) by 
optimizing (11), and for couples (eq. 5) by optimizing (12). The sub-sample of singles 
corresponds to households with only one adult with or without children, whereas the sub-
sample of couples corresponds to couples with or without children. We exclude extreme 
observations as well as individuals (households) who are self-employed or retired. We then 
estimate the models on sub-samples of potentially active individuals, as shown in table 8.  
We consider age, education and number of children6 as the observables entering vectors 
Zm, Zf and Z in equation (6) which capture differences in preferences. In tables 9 and 10, we 
report the results of the estimations, for the sub-samples of singles and couples respectively, 
giving the values of the coefficients corresponding to hours of leisure. In general terms the 
results are consistent with economic theory. The marginal utility of income increases at a 
decreasing rate and is almost always positive. This concavity is not significantly identified for 
singles. Some demographic variables affecting both income and hours of leisure are 
significant in the singles specification. In particular, the income effect increases with age and 
there are significant effects of the common fixed costs on utility. These can be attributed to 
                                                 
6 We also tried additional variables but only kept those with significant coefficients and which did not generate 
convergence problems. Information on a number of potential determinants of differences in the utility from 
working at different hour levels, such as variables for region or size of the municipality, is not available in the 
dataset. 
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unobservables such as the cost of looking for work for the unemployed or costs of commuting 
for workers. 
The coefficients in the regression corresponding to couples show that the marginal utility 
of income is positive for 99% of the sample and the utility function is concave at standard 
significance levels. The marginal utility of income is higher the older is the spouse and the 
younger is the household head. The marginal utility of hours of leisure of the household head 
is positive while it is negative for the spouse, although it increases with spouse's age, which 
may suggest that, as women's participation has increased recently, they need to stay in work 
longer in order to obtain retirement benefits. The effect of hours on marginal utility 
dominates, and the presence of children does not change it very much. Both low-educated 
men and women prefer to work more hours. Fixed costs do not seem to affect utility for 
couples. Although most of these results are similar to those found in the existing literature 
(see Blundell et al., 2000), some of them also demonstrate the specific nature of the Spanish 
labour market.  
 
4. Evaluation of the Spanish reforms: efficiency and welfare effects 
The simulation of the effects of the reforms is carried out at both the individual and the 
social level. First, we quantify the efficiency costs by looking at changes in household labour 
supply. Given the discrete nature of the labour supply alternatives, the results are reported in 
terms of transition matrices (section 4.1). The second step is the identification of winners and 
losers. This is done by comparing individual utility before and after the reform (section 4.2).  
The third and fourth evaluation exercises concern the social welfare effects of each 
reform. In section 4.3 we compare the scenarios we have simulated, ordering them by a social 
welfare function which sums individuals' weighted indirect utility. The weights capture the 
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social planner's inequality aversion. Several specifications are tested in order to carry out 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the social welfare function used.  
In section 4.4, an alternative social evaluation method is explored: this is based on a 
social welfare function which assigns weights to individual utilities measured in terms of 
equivalent incomes (King 1983). With respect to the previous method, this approach has the 
advantage of not depending on the cardinalisation of the individual utility function. 
 
4.1 Efficiency effects 
One of our main goals is to quantify the efficiency costs (measured in terms of hours of 
work) of the reforms. The reference scenario is the one in force in 1999. Tables 11 and 12 
show the transition matrices for each reform. Rows (i) contain the observed distribution of 
working hours in 1999, whereas columns (j) show the predicted distribution under each 
simulated scenario. Each cell aij of the matrix (for i≠j) shows the number of individuals 
(households) changing from the observed alternative i to the predicted alternative j. The 
diagonal elements refer to the number of individuals (households) that do not change the 
labour supply following the reform. 
In table 11 we present the results for the sub-sample of singles. The values to the right of 
the diagonal reflect individuals who increase their labour supply after the reform and vice 
versa. The first point to note is that almost all individuals remain on the diagonal, which 
means that the reforms have only little impact on labour supply. Comparing the 1999 scenario 
to that in 1998, we observe two individuals who do not work in 1999 worked 40 hours in 
1998, and three individuals working 40 hours or more reduce their labour supply (one of 
whom stops working). Along the same lines, the BIFT-25% scenario does not affect labour 
supply much either. This is due to the reduced flat tax and basic income. Three individuals 
increase their labour supply and three decrease it. The second point is that, as expected, the 
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higher the marginal tax rate, the greater the labour supply effects. Under the BIFT-38% 
scenario, average hours of work fall by 3%. Under the BIFT-46% scenario, 6.2% of 
individuals reduce their labour supply (5% of individuals decide to stop working). The VMFT 
scheme produces only small labour market disincentives: total working hours remain almost 
constant.  
Table 12 presents the transition matrices for couples. As there are nine possible 
alternatives, combining hours of work of the household head and his/her spouse, the table is 
somewhat more complicated. In this case, not all of the elements to the right (left) of the 
diagonal represent an increase (fall) in total hours of work. We may observe substitution 
between spouses' working hours. For example, under the scenario BIFT-38% we observe that 
0.5% of the households (5 out of 1,015) move from 0_40 to 40_0: under the 1999 system the 
household head does not work and the spouse works 40 hours; after the reform the head of the 
household works 40 hours and the spouse stops working (there is substitution between 
partners' hours of work). As in the previous case, two facts should be stressed. First, the 
majority of households are on the diagonal, which implies that, on aggregate, they do not 
change their labour supply. Second, the higher is the marginal tax rate the greater are the 
labour supply effects.  
When comparing the 1998 system to that in 1999 we observe very few changes. We 
obtain more or less the same results under the scenario VMFT. With a flat tax of 25% or 30% 
there are no households entering or exiting the labour market. With a flat tax of 38% or 46% 
only one household stops working while another starts working. These results are a direct 
consequence of the estimation of insignificant fixed costs.7 The picture is different under 
BIFT. In terms of total hours of work, the BIFT-38% reform reduces labour supply by 3%, 
                                                 
7 Coefficients that are not significant at the 10% level are dropped from the labour supply equation. 
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while the BIFT-46% reform reduces hours of work by 4.3%. Again, the extreme case is BIFT-
46%, in which 0.6% of households stop working and 4.7% clearly reduce their labour supply. 
The main conclusion of this analysis is that, on average, the efficiency effects are 
negligible for all of the scenarios examined and for each household type. The only exceptions 
are for the BIFT scenarios with high flat tax rates (38% and 46%). Here, the average change 
in labour supply is around 5-6% (which cannot be considered as “negligible” in terms of the 
political feasibility of the reform).   
 
4.2 Winners and losers 
A first approximation of the welfare effects may be obtained by looking at the households 
whose utility increases after the reform (winners) and those for whom it falls (losers). In each 
reform there are winners and losers, but their distribution over the income deciles is not 
uniform. We find out which part of the population benefits or loses by analyzing the 
distribution over income deciles. Unfortunately, this does not allow us to rank the reforms 
unequivocally in terms of social welfare. 
The utility function is computed using the parameters estimated in section 3. For 
households that are not potential workers we calculate utility as follows. First, fiscal units are 
identified, following the criteria established by the Tax Agency (parents and children under 
18 or disabled children). If the fiscal unit is a couple, the estimated coefficients for couples 
are used. On the other hand, if the fiscal unit is composed of one parent, without a spouse, the 
coefficients for singles are used. The other household members (grandparents, uncles, 
children over 18…) are treated as singles. The new household typology is shown in table 8. 
Figure 2 presents the results for the whole sample; winners and losers from each reform are 
shown by income deciles.  
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Comparing the 1998 and 1999 systems we see that the 1999 scenario is characterised by 
more winners than losers but, at the same time, the winners are concentrated at the top of the 
income distribution. These results are in line with those of Oliver and Spadaro (2004b) 
showing that the 1999 reform seems to favour rich households. 
The VMFT scenarios produce similar results: the poorer deciles (1 to 4) are not affected 
by the reforms. This is because these households are largely exempt from income tax and are 
thus unaffected by the reform. In the other deciles we find more losers than winners: this is 
because the marginal tax rate increases. In particular, from the fourth to the seventh or eighth 
decile the number of winners increases progressively, and then decreases (except for the 
VMFT-25% reform, in which the winners represent between 35 and 45%, starting from the 
sixth decile). The losers appear in the fifth decile and their number increases progressively 
(except under VMFT-25%, where they are fewer in the last decile due to the low marginal tax 
rate). Except for the VMFT-25% reform, the number of winners always exceeds the number 
of losers. 
The BIFT reforms affect everyone. Due to the presence of a basic income, the first deciles 
are composed of winners; the losers are concentrated in the higher deciles. Starting from the 
fourth and fifth deciles, the number of losers increases progressively. The higher is the basic 
income given to each household, the higher is the number of winners. From the comparison 
between the BIFT and the VMFT scenarios, we see that, despite similar effects at higher 
incomes, the treatment of poor households in the BIFT increases the number of winners. This 
result can thus be considered as an argument in favour of BIFT.  
 
4.3 Social welfare evaluation: an optimal taxation approach 
One possible way to analyze the social desirability of the reforms consists in computing, 
under each of the systems evaluated, a social welfare function assigning a certain weight to 
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each individual depending on the utility they obtain in each of the situations. This approach is 
typical in the optimal taxation framework (Mirrlees, 1971, Stern, 1976). This procedure has 
the advantage of summarizing in one number the welfare associated with each reform. 
However, it does require the specification of a social welfare function, which depends on the 
particular cardinalisation of the utility function. The social welfare function used here is the 
following:8 
[ ]λλ πλλ ∑∑ += ),,(*1),,(1 XLyUXLyUW cs     (13) 
where Us and Uc represent singles’ and couples’ utility respectively, π is a parameter 
weighting couples’ utility in the social welfare function, and λ is a parameter in (-∞ ,1], 
capturing the social planner's aversion to inequality. For λ = 1, the planner puts the same 
marginal weight on every household (this is the utilitarian specification), while for −∞→λ  
the government is only interested in the welfare of the poorest household (the Rawlsian 
specification).  
The results are shown in Figure 3, in which we set π = 2.9 On the x-axis, λ takes values 
from –2 (a social welfare function with greater inequality aversion) to 1 (utilitarian). On the y-
axis, we show the percentage increase or decrease in social welfare with respect to the 
reference scenario (1999). 
The reform that seems to be optimal10 (among the alternatives evaluated), independent of 
the social planner's inequality aversion, is BIFT-46%. The effects, in terms of welfare, of a 
higher basic income dominate the efficiency losses (in terms of labour supply) of a higher tax 
rate. This is certainly due to the small implicit extensive elasticities estimated in section 3. 
Other BIFT reforms with lower marginal tax rates are still more desirable than the VMFT or 
                                                 
8 To decrease the computational burden, the utility for couples and singles has been normalized to their 
respective means. The results of this section must be interpreted bearing in mind that they are not independent of  
the particular social welfare function used for the evaluation. 
9 Other plausible values of the π parameter yield the same conclusions. These results are available upon request. 
10 In the sense that it yields the maximum value of social welfare. 
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1999 systems. The only exception occurs between the BIFT-25% and the VMFT-46% and 
VMFT-38% for utilitarian specifications of the social welfare function: in these cases the two 
VMFT schemes yield higher social welfare. The reason is that the lower level of basic income 
that can be assigned with a marginal tax of 25% is not sufficient to compensate, in terms of 
welfare, for the efficiency loss resulting from the higher (25%) marginal tax rate for poor 
households11.   
 
4.4 Social welfare evaluation: computing equivalent incomes 
We complete the policy evaluation by computing equivalent incomes.12 These allow us to 
construct a social welfare function in terms of money metric utility that does not depend on 
the cardinalisation of the utility functions used.13 A prior step to computing equivalent 
incomes is to calculate the equivalent variation for each household. This is defined by the 
amount of money that we must give to (or take away from) household i before the reform so 
that the household is unaffected by the reform. Following the notation in section 3, the 
equivalent variation of household i, VEi, is obtained by solving for VEi in the following 
equation:  
[ ] [ ]ikkikiikkijjijijj ZhVEyUMaxZhyUMax ενεν ++=+ );,,();,,( 01   (14) 
Here 0isy  and 
1
isy  represent disposable income before and after the reform for household i and 
choice s respectively. Equivalent variation VEi is a variable which depends on the distribution 
of the error term, disposable income before and after the reform, and household 
characteristics. The optimal post-reform choice, j, is not necessarily the same as choice k, the 
                                                 
11 Similar results are obtained from a separate analysis of couples and singles.  
12 See King (1983) and Creedy and Duncan (2002). 
13 Other money metric utility measures exist, such as the compensating variation or consumer surplus. The 
advantage of equivalent variation over the other measures is that the reference prices are those pre-reform. This 
property renders the comparison between the reforms easier. 
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optimal choice with the equivalent variation.14 As is often the case in simulation studies, we 
assume that policy reform does not affect the error terms. A positive (negative) equivalent 
variation indicates households which increase (decrease) their utility after the reform. 
The distribution by income deciles of the equivalent variation for each reform is presented 
in table 13. Again, the pre-reform scenario is the 1999 system. Table 12 shows that, on 
average, there is a loss of 200 euros per household under the 1998 system; this figure is larger 
for the top income deciles. On the contrary, the BIFT schemes produce significant 
improvements in terms of average welfare: the large positive equivalent variations for the 
bottom deciles compensate for the losses suffered by the top deciles. The BIFT schemes 
produce average equivalent variation figures of 1328€ (for a tax rate of 46%), 953€ (38%), 
581€ (30%) and 349€ (25%). Under VMFT schemes, there is a small increase in average 
welfare resulting from the positive amounts computed for the deciles from 5 to 8-9.  
Equivalent incomes, Ye, may be computed using the equivalent variation for each 
household. The equivalent income is defined in terms of indirect utility, V(·), as: 
),(),( mtVYetV a =         (15) 
where ta is the reference price. Using the cost function: 
)),(,( bba mtVtEYe =         (16) 
where E(·) is the cost function, ta are prices before the reform and V(tb, mb) is the utility level 
achieved after the reform. Using the 1999 system as the reference, equivalent income is: 
VEyYe += 0          (17) 
This equivalent income is a measure of the welfare of each agent that does not depend on 
the cardinalisation of the utility function used. It is then possible to build a social welfare 
function in the following way: 
                                                 
14 Note that for non-potential worker households (inactive people, the self-employed) the equivalent variation 
may be computed as the difference in disposable income before and after the reform. 
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∑= λλ )Ye(N1BS         (18) 
where, as in section 4.3, λ is a parameter in (-∞ ,1] which captures inequality aversion; N is 
the number of households. 
Figures 4a and 4b show the results for values of λ from -2 to 1. They represent the 
changes in social welfare (BS) using the system in force in 1999 as the reference scenario. In 
Figure 4a we compare the 1999, 1998 and VMFT scenarios. In Figure 4b we compare the 
reference system (1999) and the BIFT scenarios.15 The first, and most important, result is that 
BIFT-46%, BIFT-38%, BIFT-30% and BIFT-25% yield (in that order) the highest values of 
social welfare independent of λ. Comparing Figures 4a and 4b we see that the rise in social 
welfare associated with BIFT is 50-60 times higher than that from VMFT. The basic income-
flat tax scenarios seem to represent the best trade-off between equity and efficiency. They are 
much more effective in raising social welfare than a vital minimum-flat tax mechanism, 
independent of the social planner's aversion to inequality.  
The other interesting result is that, with this social welfare evaluation methodology, 
VMFT schemes, and the 1998 and the 1999 systems produce very similar effects (see Figure 
4a). This is particularly true for social planners who are inequality-averse. The explanation is 
intuitive: the more Rawlsian the planner the less weight is given to changes at the middle or 
the top of the distribution. Since VMFT, 1999 and 1998 schemes have similar impacts on 
poorer households, their evaluation is practically the same. 
The fact that this social evaluation technique suggests that basic income flat tax schemes 
are the most socially desirable redistribution mechanisms reinforces the results obtained in 
section 4.3: the small labour supply effects and the large increase in the welfare of poor 
households support the BIFT mechanism as a powerful instrument for income redistribution. 
                                                 
15 We present the simulation results in two separate Figures in order to make them clearer, given the large 
difference in scale between the BIFT changes and those from the other scenarios. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have evaluated the efficiency and welfare effects (both at the individual 
and social levels) of recent reforms of the Spanish Income Tax system, compared to some 
BIFT and VMFT alternatives. The analysis is carried out using a microsimulation model in 
which labour supply reactions are explicitly taken into account. Instead of following the usual 
approach à la Hausman, we estimate the direct utility function using the methodology 
proposed by Van Soest (1995), on a sample of Spanish households taken from the 1995 wave 
of the EC Household Panel.  
We shown that the scenarios simulated have only little impact on the efficiency of the 
economy (as measured by labour supply effects). The welfare effects of VMFT reforms are 
limited. On the contrary, BIFT schemes lead to considerable improvements in the welfare of 
the poorest households (and thus social welfare). These results are robust to different social 
welfare evaluation techniques. 
In our opinion, the contributions of this paper are both methodological and policy 
oriented. From a methodological point of view this paper represents the first attempt to 
estimate labour supply reactions of Spanish households via a discrete choice approach, and 
also the first attempt to implement a comprehensive (i.e. mixing behavioural and arithmetical 
microsimulation) evaluation of the welfare effects of tax reforms. We have pointed out the 
limits and the shortcuts of this type of analysis but, at the same time we have shown that 
behavioural microsimulation models are powerful tools for the ex ante evaluation of public 
policies. 
With respect to policy, the main contribution of this paper consists in highlighting the 
potential of a basic income - flat tax scheme as an institutional redistribution mechanism 
which can both reduce inequality and increase in social welfare in Spain. Its feasibility 
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depends on the associated efficiency costs (in terms of reductions in labour supply) that may 
result: given the results of our econometric estimations, it seems that these costs are small. 
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Figure 1: Weekly hours of work of the singles and the couples (head of the household and spouse) 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1c: Couples - Spouse 
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 Figure 1b: Couples - Head of the household
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Figure 2: Winners and losers (Whole sample) 
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Figure 3: Social welfare variations with respect to the reference scenario (1999). Whole sample 
 
 
Figure 4a: Social welfare variation using equivalent incomes (with respect to the reference 
scenario, 1999). Whole sample 
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Figure 4b: Social welfare variation using equivalent incomes (with respect to the reference 
scenario, 1999). Whole sample 
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Table 1: Comparison of updated 1995 ECHP with 1998 and 1999 ECHP (in euros) 
Household mean disposable income PHOGUE 
PHOGUE 1995 
(updated) Difference 
1998 18,334 18,130.6 -1.11% 
1999 18,375 19,311 5.09% 
 
Table 2: Calibration of GLADHISPANIA (in billions of euros) 
  1998   1999  
 Official Statistics Gladhispania Difference 
Official 
Statistics Gladhispania Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) = (2-1)/1 (4) (5) (6) = (5-4)/4
Personal Income Tax collection(a) 39.2 39.1 -0.25% 39.54 37.83 -4.33% 
Average income Tax rate(c) 
= (net tax/ taxable income) 15.13% 15.59% 3.03% 23.15% 23.87% 3.12% 
Employee Social  
Security contributions(b) 13.7 13.37 -2.40% 2,424 14.26 -2.13% 
(a) Source: Informe Anual de Recaudación Tributaria de 2001; (b) Source: Anuario de Estadísticas Labourales y de Asuntos Sociales 
2002; (c) Source: Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 2001 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric section. 
SINGLES   COUPLES   
Variable Mean Standard
 deviation
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation
    
Yearly Disposable Income 14,692 9,559 Yearly Disposable Income 24,030 15,756
Weekly Hours of Leisure 135.22 17   
  Children (in %):  
Age 41.8 11.3    no children 24.3 
Education (in %):     one child 30.4 
   university graduate 37.1    two children 38.3 
   secondary school 21.2     three children or more 7.0 
   less than secondary school 41.7    
  Head of the household:   
Children (in %):  Weekly Hours of Leisure 127.7 11.6
   no children 83.4 Age 38.9 8.3
   one child 10.4 Education (in %):  
   two children 5.02    university graduate 30.8 
   three children 1.16    secondary school 19.9  
      less than secondary school 49.3 
      
   Spouse:  
   Weekly Hours of Leisure 153.1 18.5
   Age 36.6 8.1
   Education (in %):  
      university graduate 25.6 
      secondary school 20.7  
      less than secondary school 53.7 
          
Number of observations 259 Number of observations 1,015 
 
 
Table 4: Social Security contribution and Monthly Minimum and Maximum Base (in euros) 
 1998 1999 
Minimum base 477 (= minimum 
wage/12) 
485.7 (= minimum 
wage/12) 
Maximum base 2,360 2,402.7 
 Firm Worker Total 
Contribution Items 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 
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General contingencies 23.6% 23.6% 4.7% 4.7% 28.3% 28.3% 
Mean no. of industrial accidents and professional
illnesses 4% 4% 0% 0% 4% 4% 
Unemployment       
     Full-time worker (permanent worker) 6.2% 6.2% 1.6% 1.6% 7.8% 7.8% 
     Full-time worker (temporary worker) 6.2% 6.7% 1.6% 1.6% 7.8% 8.3% 
     Part time worker 6.2% 7.7% 1.6% 1.6% 7.8% 9.3% 
Social welfare fund 0.4% 0.4% 0% 0% 0.4% 0.4% 
Professional training 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 
 
Table 5: Tax rates schedule (in euros) 
1998 1999 
Single Person’s income tax 
return 
Family income tax return Single person’s and family income 
tax return 
Bracket Tax rate Bracket Tax rate Bracket Tax rate 
0-2,806.73 0 0-5,415.12 0 0-3,606.07 0.18 
2,806.73-6,977.75 0.2 5,415.12-13,492.72 0.2 3,606.07-12,621.25 0.24 
6,977.75-13,793.23 0.23 13,492.72-19,028.04 0.246 12,621.25-24,641.50 0.283 
13,793.23-21,005.37 0.28 19,028.04-26,390.44 0.29 24,641.50-39,666.08 0.372 
21,005.37-30,621.57 0.32 26,390.44-35,255.37 0.33 39,666.08-66,111.33 0.45 
30,621.57-40,838.77 0.39 35,255.37-47,485.97 0.39 > 66,111.33 0.48 
40,838.77-51,837.29 0.45 47,485.97-59,716.56 0.45   
51,837.29-63,106.27 0.52 59,716.56-72,938.83 0.53   
> 63,106.27 0.56 > 72,938.83 0.56   
 
Table 6: Advantages and disadvantages of the reforms based on a flat tax 
Advantages Disadvantages 
9 Eliminating all the current 
allowances and deductions would 
broaden the tax base. Then, all 
sources of income are treated 
equally (horizontal equity). 
9 These schemes can affect labour 
supply of the more productive 
people if the flat tax is too high 
9 Simplicity for taxpayers, and 
consequently, more transparency, 
since all income is taxed at the 
same rate) 
9 High rates can cause capital flows 
toward other countries with better 
capital fiscal treatment 
9 Simplicity for the Treasury 
Department, and thus, minor 
collection costs and less tax evasion
9 Lower flat taxes can generate 
redistribution towards the rich 
 
Table 7: BIFT and VMFT: simulated scenarios (in euros) 
 BIFT VMFT 
Flat tax Basic Income Vital Minimum
46% 4,632 13,997 
38% 3,526 12,002 
30% 2,421 9,589 
25% 1,730 7,737 
 
Table 8: New typology of households 
  Total households Potential 
workers 
Singles 1000 259 
Couples 3,195 1,015 
Other households  
   Fiscal unit treated as couples 1,852  
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   Fiscal unit treated as singles 373  
   Other individuals treated as singles 3,392  
Total 9,812 1,274 
 
Table 9: Singles estimation 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
   
Income2 -0.41 0.50 
Hours of leisure2 -236.95 32.44 
Income x Hours of leisure 29.06 5.81 
   
Income -25.54 6.77 
   x Age 0.50 0.25 
   x Education 0.04 0.84 
   x Children 0.19 0.16 
   
Hours of leisure 458.94 65.24 
   x Age -0.49 1.53 
   x Educ1 -4.19 3.93 
   x Educ2 0.39 2.89 
   
Fixed costs 2.40 0.50 
      
Number of observations 259   
Log likelihood -273.84    
Note. The variables have been rescaled in the following way: Income = disposable income in euros/30000; Hours of leisure = (24x7 
– weekly hours of work)/150; Age = (age in years – 38)/10; Education = average number of years of study/10; Educ1 = university 
graduate; Educ2 = secondary school; Children = number of children (under 16) in the household. 
 
 
Table 10: Couples estimation 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Income2 -0.71   0.16   
Hours of leisure of the household’s head2 -83.69   6.30   
Hours of leisure of the spouse2 91.98   8.01   
Income x Hours of leisure of the household’s head -2.74   1.51   
Income x Hours of leisure of the spouse -1.69   1.01   
Hours of leisure of the household’s head x Hours of leisure of the spouse -44.8   7.98   
   
Income 8.20   2.37   
   x Age of the household’s head -0.60   0.48   
   x Age of the spouse 1.54   0.55   
   x Age of the spouse 2 -0.63   0.19   
   
Hours of leisure of the household’s head 197.53   17.25   
   x Education of the household’s head -5.68   1.81   
   x Age of the household’s head 2.19   0.67   
   
Hours of leisure of the spouse -117.38   17.65   
   x Education of the spouse -11.1   1.20   
   x Age of the spouse 2.02   0.61   
   x 1(one dependent child) 2.82   0.95   
   x 1(two or more dependent children) 5.05   0.90   
   
Fixed costs -0.35   0.26   
   
Number of observations 1024    
Log likelihood -1553.81    
Note. The variables have been rescaled in the following way: Income = disposable income in euros/30000; Hours of leisure = (24x7 
– weekly hours of work)/160; Age = (age in years – 38)/10; Education = average number of years of study/10 
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Table 11: Singles transition matrixes (the reference system is the one of 1999) 
  1998  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 48   2   50 
30   34   34 
40 1  127  128 19
99
 
50   1 1 45 47 
 Total 49 35 130 45 259  
 
  BIFT25  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 48   2   50 
30   34   34 
40 1  126 1 128 19
99
 
50    1 46 47 
 Total 49 34 129 47 259  
  BIFT30  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 50       50 
30   34   34 
40 3  124 1 128 19
99
 
50   1 1 45 47 
 Total 53 35 125 46 259  
  BIFT38  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 50       50 
30 2 31 1  34 
40 3 1 120 4 128 19
99
 
50 2 1  44 47 
 Total 57 33 121 48 259  
  BIFT46  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 50       50 
30 2 31 1  34 
40 8 1 115 4 128 19
99
 
50 3 1 1 42 47 
 Total 63 33 117 46 259  
  VMFT25  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 49   1   50 
30   34   34 
40    127 1 128 19
99
 
50    1 46 47 
 Total 49 34 129 47 259  
  VMFT30  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 49   1   50 
30   34   34 
40    127 1 128 19
99
 
50    2 45 47 
 Total 49 34 130 46 259  
  VMFT38  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 49   1   50 
30   33 1  34 
40   1 126 1 128 19
99
 
50    3 44 47 
 Total 49 34 131 45 259  
  VMFT46  
  0 30 40 50 Total 
0 48 1 1   50 
30   33 1  34 
40 1 1 124 2 128 19
99
 
50 1  3 43 47 
 Total 50 35 129 45 259  
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Table 12: Couples transition matrixes (the reference system is the one of 1999) 
  1998   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 4           1     5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40    58       58 
40_0     395  1 1   397 
40_25     1 59     60 
40_40       194    194 
50_0        203 1  204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40     1     67 68 
 Total 4 5 58 397 59 195 205 25 67 1015  
  BIFT25   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40 1  54 3      58 
40_0 1   393   2  1 397 
40_25     4 56     60 
40_40    1   188 5   194 
50_0 2   1   201   204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40     1  1 1  65 68 
 Total 9 5 55 402 56 189 209 24 66 1015  
  BIFT30   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40 1  54 3      58 
40_0 1   395   1   397 
40_25    1 5 54     60 
40_40 1  1 4  182 6   194 
50_0 2   1   201   204 
50_25    1     23  24 
19
99
 
50_40     2  1 1  64 68 
 Total 10 5 57 410 54 183 209 23 64 1015  
  BIFT38   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40 1  52 5      58 
40_0 1   396      397 
40_25    1 6 52  1   60 
40_40 1  1 14 1 169 8   194 
50_0 3   2   199   204 
50_25    1     23  24 
19
99
 
50_40    2 2   1  63 68 
 Total 11 5 57 425 53 169 209 23 63 1015  
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Table 12: Couples transition matrixes (the reference system is the one of 1999) [cont.] 
  BIFT46   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40 1  52 5      58 
40_0 1   396      397 
40_25    1 8 49 1 1   60 
40_40 1  1 20 1 158 13   194 
50_0 3   7   194   204 
50_25    1     23  24 
19
99
 
50_40    3 7   1  57 68 
 Total 11 5 58 443 50 159 209 23 57 1015  
  VMFT25   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40    58       58 
40_0     393   3  1 397 
40_25     2 58     60 
40_40    1   188 5   194 
50_0        204   204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40       1 1  66 68 
 Total 5 5 59 395 58 189 213 24 67 1015  
  VMFT30   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 5                 5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40    56 1 1     58 
40_0     393   3 1  397 
40_25    1 3 56     60 
40_40    1 4 1 182 6   194 
50_0        204   204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40       1 1  66 68 
 Total 5 5 58 401 58 183 214 25 66 1015  
  VMFT38   
 hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 4   1             5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40    56 1 1     58 
40_0     389 1  5 1 1 397 
40_25    1 3 55  1   60 
40_40 1  1 10 1 173 8   194 
50_0        203 1  204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40    1  1    66 68 
 Total 5 5 60 403 59 173 217 26 67 1015  
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Table 12: Couples transition matrixes (the reference system is the one of 1999). Cont. 
  VMFT46   
 Hm_hf 0_0 0_25 0_40 40_0 40_25 40_40 50_0 50_25 50_40 Total 
0_0 4   1             5 
0_25   5        5 
0_40    56 1 1     58 
40_0     388 1 1 5 1 1 397 
40_25    1 4 54 1    60 
40_40 1   13 1 170 9   194 
50_0     2   201 1  204 
50_25         24  24 
19
99
 
50_40    2 1  1   64 68 
 Total 5 5 60 409 57 173 215 26 65 1015  
 
Table 13: Equivalent variations (in euros) 
 1998 46% 38% 30% 25% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Decile Disposable 
income 
BIFT 
(4,632) 
VMFT 
(13,997)
BIFT 
(3,526)
VMFT 
(12,002)
BIFT 
(2,421)
VMFT 
(9,589) 
BIFT 
(1,730) 
VMFT 
(7,737) 
1 0 4,729 0 3,600 0 2,472 0 1,767 0
2 1 4,441 0 3,353 3 2,264 1 1,590 0
3 6 3,099 0 2,227 0 1,351 2 811 0
4 -31 2,452 0 1,689 8 925 17 435 3
5 -150 2,134 115 1,396 104 641 92 213 7
6 -257 1,369 355 801 349 219 166 -117 -52
7 -301 717 688 324 482 -86 208 -291 -90
8 -337 -170 979 -273 597 -384 173 -449 -155
9 -407 -1,471 823 -1,143 259 -779 -132 -629 -312
10 -561 -4,011 -1,638 -2,436 -933 -809 -173 161 496
Mean -204 1,328 132 953 87 581 35 349 -10
 
  
 
